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COMMENT
FROM DURESS TO INTENT: SHIFTING THE BURDEN
IN PRISON-ESCAPE PROSECUTIONS
In the early morning hours of August 26, 1976, Clifford Bailey,
Ronald Clifton Cooley, and Ralph Walker escaped from the New
Detention Center of the District of Columbia Jail.- They were not
apprehended until September 27, November 19, and December 13,
1976, respectively. 2 On November 23, 1976 the three men were
indicted under the federal escape statute.3 At their trial, the defendants did not deny that they had escaped from jail.4 Instead,
they presented evidence to the jury to establish that there had been
frequent fires . . . set by both inmates and guards, and
often allowed to burn while the inmates suffered from lack
of proper ventilation, that [they] had been threatened with
physical violence by guards, that . . . Bailey and Cooley
had actually been beaten by guards, that . . . Walker had
epilepsy and had received inadequate medical treatment
for his condition, and that . . . Cooley had been forced by
his co-[defendants] to leave the jail."
The trial judge instructed the jury that such prison conditions, " 'no
matter how burdensome or restrictive an individual inmate may find
I United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990).
2 Id.1106 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
3 Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney
General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility
in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any
custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the
United States by any court, judge, or magistrate, or from the custody of
an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall,
if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of
felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both; or if the custody or confinement is for extradition or by virtue of an arrest or charge of or for a misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. §751(a) (1976).
4 585 F.2d at 1106 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
5Id. 1091 (citations omitted). Judge Wilkey, writing in dissent, challenged
each of these allegations, asserting that "there was no evidence of a lire on 26
August 1976, the day of the escape"; that, although a group of guards attacked
Bailey, "[tihis incident occurred, according to the inmate [who testified at trial],
more than three weeks before Bailey's escape"; that the chief medical officer at
New Jail testified that there was no evidence that Walker was an epileptic; and
that Cooley testified "that he left the jail by himself and that he did not know
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them to be, are not a defense to the charges in this case, nor justification for the commission of the offense of escape.' "6 In addition, the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider a defense
of duress, for none of the defendants had attempted to surrender
after the escape, 7 and had thus failed to meet a prerequisite to the
assertion of the duress defense. All three defendants were found
guilty as charged under the federal escape statute.
On appeal, a divided United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in an opinion by Chief Judge J. Skelley
Wright, reversed the three convictions and remanded the cases for
retrial.8 The court found that prejudicial error in the district
court's instruction to the jury concerning the elements of "escape"
had precluded the jury from assessing evidence pertaining to the
nature of the defendants' intent.9 Prejudicial error was also per-

ceived in the trial court's imposition of a "return requirement"
conditioning the assertion of the duress defense. Chief Judge
Wright approved the prevailing doctrine that escape is a "continuing offense," stating that "one may commit the crime of escape, even
if his original departure from custody was justified, by failing or
refusing to return to custody once the justifying circumstance is no
longer present." 10 This analysis sensibly assumes that justification
of the original departure should not allow an escapee to remain free
from incarceration indefinitely. Thus it is an "escape" if the condition that precipitated the initial departure disappears and the
escapee continues to remain free. Commission of the crime of
escape may therefore postdate the actual departure from prison.
This theory of escape as a continuing offense was reflected in
neither the indictment 11 nor the charge to the jury. 12 Both rewhether Bailey and Walker left at all." Id. 1106-08 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
6 Id.1091 n.9 (quoting Trial Record at 773, United States v. Bailey, D.C. Crim.
No. 76-735 (D.D.C. March 14, 1977), rev'd, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990)).
7 Id. 1091. Walker testified that after the escape he established and maintained
"a constant rapport with the FBI," although he admitted that he never turned
himself in. Id. 1108 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
8 Id. 1105. A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Wilkey. In an additional
section of the opinion, not considered in this Comment, the court rejected the
defendants' argument that they were not guilty of the federal crime of escape
because they had not technically been "in the custody of the Attorney General."
Id. 1104.
9Id.1101.
10 Id. 1099-100 (emphasis in original).
11 Defendants were indicted for "fleeting] and escap[ing]' '[o]n or about
August 26, 1976."' Id. (quoting Record at 32, United States v. Bailey, D.C. Crim.
No. 76-735 (D.D.C. March 14, 1977), reo'd, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990)).
12 Id.
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ferred to an alleged crime occurring on August 26, 1976. Indeed,
the trial judge's instructions, "rather than explaining a 'continuing
offense' concept to the jury, emphasized the notion that the offense
took place when appellants left the jail on August 26." 13 The error
was that, notwithstanding his failure to explain the continuing
nature of escape, the trial judge independently found the defendants
guilty of an escape subsequent to the original departure, employing
"a theory (failure to return) that was never presented either to
[defendants] or to the jury." 14 The trial court thus implicitly concluded that the precipitating condition (which initially may have
caused the escape) had disappeared, and further, that the defendants
had not returned, contrary to their obligation to do so. This conclusion, however, involved a finding of fact. Chief Judge Wright
refused to countenance such a judicial incursion into the province
of the jury, an incursion which he said undercut the defendants'
constitutional right to a trial by jury. This error could have been
avoided had the jury been instructed that the defense of duress must
justify both the initial departure and the continued absence from
prison.15
With Bailey, the District of Columbia Circuit became the first
federal appellate court to suggest that the defense of duress might
justify an escape that was induced by intolerable prison conditions.'6
13Id. (citation omitted).
14Id. 1100-01 (emphasis in original).
'DId. 1101. See text accompanying notes 21-29 infra.
16 Confusion inevitably results when the defense of duress (or necessity) is
introduced by the defendant in prison escape prosecutions. See United States v.
Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1978); Gardner, The Defense of Necessity
and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from
Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110, 115-18 (1975); Comment, From Lovercamp to a Prisoner'sRight to Escape: An Inescapable Conclusion?, 26 B=riALo L.
REv.413 (1976). See also Note, Prison Escape: Justification as a Defense-People
v. Lovercamp, 5 CAP. U. L. REy. 293, 319 (1976); Case Note, People v. Lovercamp,
9 Loy. L. REv. 466, 475 (1976); Note, California Court Holds the Defense of
Necessity Available to Prison Escapees-People v. Lovercamp, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
271, 272 [hereinafter cited as California Court].
Necessity is generally said to constitute a justificatory defense, whereas duress
is considered an excuse.
To offer a justification for the act is to accept responsibility for it but to
deny that, given the factual situation, it was either morally or legally
wrong.... In situations of justification the act is condoned and the actor
sometimes lauded. In contrast, a defense based on excuse admits the
wrongfulness of the act, but suggests, for one reason or another, that the
accused is not to blame.
Gardner, supra, at 116 (footnotes omitted). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-r,
LAw §§ 49-50 (1972). Appellate courts have consistently
HArDBooK ON Cnvt.
commingled the two defenses; what is labelled "necessity" for one case is often
labelled "duress" by another appellate court addressing the same set of facts. Compare People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974)
(defendants escaped to avoid homosexual assault; court discussed the proffered
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Only recently has the judiciary begun to question the previously
entrenched "hands ofF' attitude' 7 toward prison administration,
gradually recognizing that administrators of penal institutions cannot be absolutely relied upon to safeguard their prisoners.' 8 Concomitant with this more interventionist posture, has grown a recognition among various state courts that duress (or necessity)' may be
a legitimate defense, within carefully defined boundaries, for the
escapee who has fled intolerable prison conditions. 19 At the very
least, Bailey is another instance of this increasing sensitivity to conditions in American prisons and to the plight of the individual
prisoner-defendant.
Yet Bailey is more than one additional citation in the lengthening series of cases that accept the use of duress or necessity as affirmadefense in terms of necessity) with People v. Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d
187 (1975) (defendants escaped to avoid homosexual attacks; court held that
defendants could properly raise the defense of duress). The distinction is generally
based upon the nature of the force that compels the actor to commit the criminal
act: necessity involves non-human threats of harm (e.g., fire or storm); duress
involves human threats of harm (e.g., a "gun to the head"). See CaliforniaCourt,
supra, at 274. "T1his confusion [between the two concepts] can be minimized,
however, by concentrating on the basic principles underlying a proffered defense
and avoiding unhelpful labels such as 'duress' or 'necessity."' United States v.
Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621
(U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990). Bailey condenses the concepts of duress and necessity
under the general heading of "compulsion" defenses, which are then analyzed in
terms of the two separate principles of excuse and justification. The case thereby
pays heed to the rationales underlying the distinction between duress and necessity
rather than to unhelpful fixed notions that focus exclusively on the source of the
force. Id. 1096-98. The particular terminology used by the courts thus ultimately
becomes of secondary importance in understanding the present state of the law.
The important questions concern the specific conditions that permit the use of such
defenses, their rationale, and their implications.
17 Compare Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969) ("We
have consistently adhered to the so-called 'bands off policy in matters of prison
administration according to which we have said that the basic responsibility for the
control and management of penal institutions, including the discipline, treatment,
and care of those confined, lies with the responsible administrative agency and is
not subject to judicial review unless exercised in such a manner as to constitute
clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison officials.") with People v. Harmon,
53 Mich. App. 482, 483, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232
N.W.2d 187 (1975) ("The time has come when we can no longer close our eyes
to the growing problem of institutional gang rapes in our prison system.").
18 The persons in charge of our prisons and jails are obliged to take reasonable precautions in order to provide a place of confinement where a prisoner
is safe from gang rapes and beatings by fellow inmates, safe from guard
ignorance of pleas for help and safe from intentional placement into situations where an assault of one type or another is likely to result. If our
prison system fails to live up to its responsibilities in this regard we should
not, indirectly, countenance such a failure by precluding the presentation
of a defense based on these facts.
People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 484, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1974), affd,
394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975).
19 See text accompanying notes 35-47 infra.
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tive defenses in prison-escape prosecutions. Its greatest significance,
however, derives from its employment of a revised definition
of criminal intent in escape prosecutions. Its holding that one element of the crime of escape is an intent to avoid confinement allows
intolerable prison conditions to be used as evidence of a lack of
intent to escape confinement, rather than as an affirmative defense
only. This innovative approach, which serves to shift the burden
of proof to the prosecution, is novel in the federal courts.
Part I of this Comment reviews the Bailey duress theory, considering the case in relation to prior case law to determine what,
if anything, Bailey adds to the tests that various courts have developed. Part II examines the validity of the Bailey majority's intent theory, exploring its basis and focusing on the criteria that
constitute the intent "test." Finally, Part III considers the future
and suggests some potential effects of such an approach upon both
the individual defendants and society. The Comment concludes
that the Bailey decision is properly sensitive to the interests of the
escapee without unjustifiably ignoring societal interests.
I. DuREss:

THE RELAXATION OF THE TRADITIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF IMMINENCY

A. The Return Requirement-A Jury Question
Bailey's discussion of the duress defense focused on the narrow
issue whether a jury should be allowed to consider the defense "in
the absence of one of the special prerequisites some courts have
imposed upon such defenses in escape cases-the requirement that
an escapee turn himself in to the authorities immediately after
escaping." 20 Chief Judge Wright did not question the validity of
the return requirement. On the contrary, he stated that "[it] stands
2

o United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990) (footnote omitted). Further requirements limit an escapee's successful pleading of a duress defense. The seminal case
of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974), propounded five conditions:

(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible
sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists
a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints
illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison
personnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when
he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
Id. 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16 (footnote omitted).
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for the limited and commonsense notion that a choice of evils defense to the crime of 'escape'-defined as leaving and staying away
from custody-lasts only as long as the choice of evils justifies a
failure to return." 21 Fulfillment of this prerequisite has long characterized the successful pleading of this affirmative defense; 22 duress
claims have frequently failed because escapees continued to stay
away after their initial departures from custody. 23 The majority did
not fault the trial court's emphasis on the return requirement, but
rested its holding on the absence from the indictment and from the
charge to the jury of the proper theory of escape, which absence
served to undermine the defendants' constitutional right to a trial
24

by jury.

This limited, technical holding can provide little solace to the
Bailey defendants. As Judge Wilkey pointed out in dissent, "defendants admit that they did not return to custody .

.

.

[and]

defendants have adduced no evidence whatever justifying their continued absence from custody." 25 Ironically, as the dissent suggests,
the trial court's failure to instruct properly on the "continuing
offense" nature of escape could only have served to benefit the defendants: "[I]f the jury had been fully instructed on the continuing
offense aspect of escape, it would have been irrationalfor it to have
acquitted defendants, in light of the fact that defendants admitted
remaining at large and failed to adduce any evidence to justify their
continued absence." 2 6 The majority did not in any way question
the firm rule, prescribed by previous cases, that an unjustified continued absence from custody bars the presentation of the duress
defense. 27 Nevertheless, even given the apparently nugatory effect
of the remand, the dissent failed to rebut satisfactorily the majority's
underlying concern: it is rightfully the province of the jury, as the
21 585 F.2d at 1100. "Choice of evils" in this context denotes the justification
element of duress. See note 16 supra.
22

See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr.

110, 115 (1974); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 337-38, 236 N.W.2d 72,
75-76 (1975)

(adopting verbatim the final four conditions set forth in Lovercamp,

quoted in note 20 supra).
23 See, e.g., Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. App. 1975) (court recognized
the possibility of a successful necessity defense, but held against defendant because

he did not return for four weeks); Matthews v. State, 288 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1974)
(court refused to allow necessity defense in part because the defendant did not
immediately return to custody after the initial impending danger but, rather, con-

tinued to flee farther away).
24
See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
25 585 F.2d at 1116 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
26 Id. 1117 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
27 See, e.g., cases cited in note 23 supra.
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trier of fact, and not of the trial judge, to consider whether there
were circumstances justifying the defendants' failure to return.
To remand the case solely upon this failure to accord the jury
its proper role, however, could be ineffectual. On remand, the trial
court would properly instruct the jury that escape is a continuing
offense. Unless the defendants were to present additional evidence,
the court could then hold as a matter of law that the duress defense
is unavailable to the defendants because they did not return to
custody. 28 The very case upon which the majority based its holding
articulated such a procedure.2 9 Chief Judge Wright's technical approach to the duress defense therefore leaves the Bailey defendants
in the same position as before the remand; they will remain unable
to reach the jury with a duress defense on retrial unless they are
able to introduce facts to explain and justify their failure to return
to custody.
B. The Imminency Requirement-A Standard Relaxed
Bailey's limited, technical holding obscures its real contribution
to the law governing the applicability of the duress defense to
escapes: a marked liberalizing of the previous, stringent requirement of an imminent danger to the prisoner. Its brief suggestion
that there might have been sufficient imminent danger to these
escapees to justify a duress defense and its silence on other requisite
aspects of the defense signal an approach that is more flexible than
the doctrine reflected in earlier cases.
Until quite recently 3 0 the judiciary inexorably applied a strict
requirement of "imminent and impending danger," 31 sometimes
28

"[T]he majority concedes that if the court had instructed the jury fully as to
the 'continuing offense' aspect of escape, then it could properly have held as a matter
of law that the duress defense was unavailable and thereby have precluded jury
consideration of the defense." 585 F.2d at 1117 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original). The majority made no such concession, at least not explicitly. But see
note 29 infra & accompanying text.
29United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977). "Therefore,
when an escapee fails to submit to proper authorities, the asserted duress defense
must be rejected because as a matter of law it does not negate the continued absence
from custody." Id. 570 (emphasis added). "[Defendant's] failure to report to the
proper authorities during his nearly two years of freedom following his escape ...
precludes jury consideration of the asserted duress defense." Id. 571.
30 See note 42 infra.
31 United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1978); State v. Milum,
213 Kan. 581, 583, 516 P.2d 984, 986 (1973) ("It is apparent that the threats ...
were made on several different occasions and thus could not have met the statutory
requirement of imminence."); Pittman v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 488, 490
(Ky. 1974); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
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with shockingly harsh results.8 2 This hard line limited successful
defenses to escape and restricted judicial review of prison conditions.88 Some later cases, however, have tempered this standard.
In People v. Harmon,3A the escapee had been attacked on two separate occasions by a group of inmates demanding homosexual favors.
When the defendant refused, he was beaten; when he was threatened
a third time, he escaped.35 At trial, the defendant raised the duress
defense.8 6 The court rejected a "hands off" approach 8 7 and held
that the jury must be allowed to consider such a defense. 8s In elucidating the conditions that delimit duress, the court conceded that
a generalized fear of homosexual attacks would not suffice,3 9 but it
did not adopt the extreme view of the earlier courts.40 "[T]he issue
of whether the alleged danger was immediate or imminent is, in all
but the clearest cases, to be decided by the trier of fact taking into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances, including the defendant's opportunity and ability to avoid the threatened harm." 41
Later cases have approved the Harmon result, rejecting the earlier
harsh approach.4 There remained, however, the prerequisite that
32 "'Compulsion which will excuse,' it has been said, 'must be present, imminent,
and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or great bodily harm if the act is not done."' B. Pum-urs, CnrmaNAL LAw
954 (2d ed. 1969) (citations omitted). Some cases have blindly followed this
precept of general criminal law, even though the crime of prison escape raises unique
problems that demand an alternative approach. See text accompanying notes 51-59
infra. In State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1072 (1972), the defendant was forced to submit to sodomy on two separate
occasions. When he was threatened for a third time, he complained to prison
officials, who told him to "fight it out, submit to the assaults, or go over the fence."
Defendant chose the last option. At his trial, he attempted to raise the defense
of duress. The court responded: "This is not a case where defendant escaped while
being closely pursued by those who sought by threat of death or bodily harm to
have him submit to sodomy." Id. 568. State v. Green was questioned in a later
case in the same jurisdiction. State v. Haddix, 566 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
33 See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950);
People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969). See note
17 supra.
34 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232
N.W.2d 187 (1975).
35 Id. 486, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
36 ld.
37

8

See note 17 supra.
53 Mich. App. at 485, 220 N.W.2d at 214.

39 Id.
40

See note 31 supra.
4153 Mich. App. at 485-86, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
42
People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974),
stated that in order to establish a duress defense, the defendant must, inter alia,
"[be] faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial
bodily injury in the immediate future." Id. 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115. See note 20
supra. Lovercamp did not specify the time interval required between the last threat
of attack and the escape itself. The court did, however, clearly reject the approach
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the specific threat be closely related in time to the escape.4 3 "'A
threat of future injury is not enough.' "44
The Bailey decision goes beyond even these liberalizing cases.
The threat faced by the Bailey defendants as a result of the alleged
intolerable prison conditions was neither imminent nor impending.
There was no evidence that the alleged fires had been set on the
day of the escape; 45 there had been no recent instances of guard
of State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1072 (1972), described in note 32 supra, summarizing Green to exemplify the
judicial insensitivity that marked earlier cases. Lovercamp accordingly did not
require the defendant to delay his escape until his attackers were upon him.
Subsequent state court cases in various jurisdictions have further modified the
imminency requirement. See, e.g., People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236
N.W.2d 72 (1975). In People v. Unger, 66 Ill.
2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977),
the state argued that all five Lovercamp conditions, quoted in note 20 supra, must
be met before the defendant could establish his duress defense. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected such a rigid approach:
We agree with the State and with the court in Lovercamp that [these
conditions] are relevant factors to be used in assessing claims of necessity.
We cannot say, however, that the existence of each condition is, as a
matter of law, necessary to establish a meritorious necessity defense.
• . . The absence of one of the Lovercamp preconditions does not
alone disprove the claim of necessity and should not, therefore, automatically preclude an instruction on the defense.
Id. 342-43, 362 N.E.2d at 323.
The Bailey dissent would adhere to the harsh rule expressed in the earlier
cases: "If the danger threatened is not immediate, the defense is not available
[citing State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1072 (1972), discussed in note 32 supra]. The defense is reserved for backto-the-wall situations. This requirement has been adopted by every court that has
considered the availability of the defense in escape cases." United States v. Bailey,
585 F.2d 1087, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990). In this instance the
dissent was clearly incorrect, for an Illinois court had recently bluntly rejected such a
requirement in People v. Unger, 33 Ill. App. 3d 770, 338 N.E.2d 442 (1975), aff'd,
66 I1. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977). "We do not believe that a 'gun to the head
immediacy' is essential to establish either compulsion or necessity. To require that
a prisoner be immediately pursued by armed inmates is unrealistic if this is made a
condition to justify escape to save a prisoner's life." Id. 775, 338 N.E.2d at 446.
Even the leading case of People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212
(1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (defendant escaped 24 hours
after a confrontation in which he was threatened with death) was not as harsh as the
Bailey dissent implies, as it did not involve a "gun-to-the-head" circumstance:
"'[W]hat constitutes present, immediate and impending compulsion depends on the
circumstances of each case.'
394 Mich. at 626, 232 N.W.2d at 188 (quoting People
v. Richter, 54 Mich. App. 598, 221 N.W.2d 429 (1974)). But see People v.
Condley, 69 Cal. App. 3d 999, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 988
(1977); State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 432, 516 P.2d 984 (1973); State v. Jones, 2 Kan.
App. 2d 220, 577 P.2d 357 (1978).
43 See cases cited in note 42 supra.
44People v. Hoequard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 337, 236 N.W.2d 72, 75 (1975)
(quoting People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920)).
45 United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990).
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brutality directed against any of the defendants; 46 and the complaint
of inadequate medical care was principally advanced only by defendant Walker. 47 There was simply no threat that they "would
be dead before the evening [or even the week] was out." 48
Judge Wilkey, in dissent, objected vehemently to this extension
of duress to general and protracted fears, challenging the majority
"'to cite one case, federal or state, in which claims of this type have
been deemed sufficient to raise a duress defense." 49 Such cases do
not in fact exist. Indeed, the Bailey decision does not articulate or
explain a new test of imminence. The fact that the case was remanded, however, suggests that intolerable prison conditions of the
sort alleged by the defendants might be sufficient to establish a
duress defense. The court's only statement regarding the question
of imminent and immediate danger was confined to a footnote that
offered a rationale for the relaxation of the immediacy requirement
in the extraordinary situation of prison escapes:
The dissent's narrow insistence on threats of "immediate"
harm as an absolute prerequisite for the choice of evils
defense seems particularly inappropriate in escape cases,
where a possibility for escape (especially nonviolent escape)
is not likely to remain available until a substantial threat
becomes "immediate" in the narrow sense urged by the
dissent.50
Although the court was unclear in its relaxation of the imminency requirement, such a relaxation does reflect a realistic understanding of prison conditions. In prison, the threat of a "future
injury" I1 can instill fear equally as intense as that created by more
immediate, specific threats. Confined inmates must wait helplessly,
hoping that the threatened harm (whether a suffocating fire or a
homosexual assault) does not materialize.8 2 Under these circum46 Id. 1107. In Bailey's case a fellow inmate did testify that "he had received
a beating by one of the guards who then told him to deliver a message to defendant
Bailey to the effect that the guards were going to kill him and beat him for testifying
in a particular court case." Id. (footnote omitted). Even this threat, however, was
not closely related in time to the escape.
47 Id.
48 People v. Unger, 33 Ill. App. 3d 770, 775, 338 N.E.2d 442, 446 (1975),

aft'd, 66 IMI.2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
49 585 F.2d at 1117 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

5o Id.1099 m39.
51 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
52 A prisoner may be threatened by a fellow inmate who tells him that he is
going to be attacked, or by fires that periodically break out in his cellblock, causing
suffocating smoke. Although any one particular fire may not threaten his present
safety, it may create a reasonable ongoing apprehension that future fires will be
more dangerous.
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stances, the differences between "general" threats and "specific"
threats become meaningless; the nature of the fear produced by
"generalized" fears is quite similar to that produced in the "specific
threat" situation. The idea of "immediate danger" is also less
relevant in prisons. The prisoner cannot evaluate his degree of
vulnerability as can nonprisoners; in addition, prisoners have a
restricted ability to respond to threats.53
Given the nature of the prison environment, the dissent's call
for an immediate danger as a prerequisite for assertion of the duress
defense demands an unrealistic degree of self-control by prisoners.
Although some recent cases are more sensitive to actual prison conditions, 54 their demand for a "present injury" is similarly implausible in some instances. A frightened inmate should not be required
to wait passively until his general fears (that he could be next)
ripen into specific fears (that he will be next) and then, in turn,
until the danger itself is "present." Because prisoners are not in
a position to wait until the last minute,55 the test of imminency
should be an attenuated one-the escape must be closely related in
53 If the prisoner must delay his attempt until the last moment, it will then be

almost impossible to escape the threatened harm, for his attackers are likely to
overpower him. See State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. 1971) (en bane)
(Seller, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1072 (1972) ("If escape were to save
[the defendant], it had to be made earlier than the last minute."). In almost all of
the reported cases that have allowed the defense, the defendant escaped after the
threat but before the actual assault. People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d
184 (1975), is a startling exception. Six assailants made homosexual demands of
defendant; when he refused he was assaulted and "literally chased off the [prison]
grounds." Id. 621, 232 N.W.2d at 186. This usual timing pattern is not surprising,
as one of the policies underlying the availability of the duress defense to escapees
is concern for the personal security of the prisoner. The requirements of the defense
should therefore be attuned to this principle. It is anomalous, then, to require the
prisoner to wait until his assailants arrive, when flight from the impending assault
will be hopeless.
The closed nature of prison society exacerbates tensions, causing threats to
remain "in the air" as continually lurking possibilities. See Note, Duress and the
Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1062, 1074
(1972). Furthermore, the prisoner who voiced the threat is encountered daily in
a setting where violence is commonplace. In such close quarters he cannot be
avoided. Moreover,
the availability of weapons and the sudden and often senseless nature of
attacks within the prison may create in the threatened inmate an ongoing
apprehension which will linger far beyond the moment of the actual
threat. .

.

. [The] chance that the assailant will appear at any moment

and attack is a constantly reinforced possibility.
Id. 1075 (footnote omitted). See also Note, Availability of the Duress Defense in
Prison Escapes: People v. Lovercamp, 12 WAKE FonEsT L. REv. 1102, 1112 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as Availability of the Duress Defense]. Possibilities of escape are
infrequent and cannot be discriminately chosen to match the threatened attack. See
id. 1106.
5
4 See cases cited in note 42 supra.
55 See note 53 supra.
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time to the threat-rather than one of strict imminency."" In each
case, whether the defendant has successfully met the test of imminence should be determined by the trier of fact. The time elapsed
between the threat and the anticipated harm should be considered
in light of two factors: the quality of the threat and the nature of the
prison conditions. In some instances a threat may be especially
dangerous (even when a day or two has already elapsed) if violence
is a commonplace occurrence at that prison, thereby magnifying
even the most minute threat into potential harm. On the other
hand, some significant threats may vanish within hours if made in
an atmosphere where violence is rare and the prison administration
is highly sensitive to its prisoners' safety.
This relaxed notion of the duress defense, however, should not
give a free rein to any inmate who escapes and then attempts to
excuse his behavior because he can point to intolerable conditions
within the prison. Duress would remain limited by the further
requirement that the inmate convince the trier of fact that such
threatened intolerable conditions would have impinged upon his
personal security. Such personalized "impingement" was present
in Bailey; the defendants, therefore, should have been permitted to
present their defense to the trier of fact. But had the present defendants merely alleged that other inmates were targets of guard
brutality, that other inmates were denied proper medical treatment,
and that other inmates suffered from fires and smoke, it would
have been unreasonable to argue that duress existed because of the
creation of general fears. On the contrary, the inmate must posit a
close connection; he must be able to point to intolerable conditions
that directly affected him.
Bailey itself does not propose this, or any other test. Indeed,
the entire issue of imminency is treated summarily. 57 Nevertheless, the proposed liberalized test suggested by Bailey and explored
in this Comment would evaluate more justly the plight of the individual defendant who is unable to distinguish between levels of
fear based on the relative imminence of some future harm. 58 As a
GO See Availability of the Duress Defense, supra note 53, at 1107.
5
7 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
58 The applicability of the duress defense requires a consideration of other
factors in addition to imminency. Indeed, Bailey recognized the relevance of the
five conditions required in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr.
110 (1974), quoted in note 20 supra, but did not require that each be met before
the defendant can introduce his duress defense.
The court... holds that, at least when a defendant as in this case, introduces substantial evidence of extreme conditions, the jury is not absolutely
prohibited from considering such evidence merely because certain inflexible
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California court stated: "In a humane society some attention must
be given to the individual dilemma." 59
II. INTENT: THE NEW TEST ARTICULATED

In addition to relaxing the imminency requirement, the District of Columbia Circuit in Bailey also rejected the trial court's
holding that the crime of escape requires only general, rather than
specific, intent.60 As a result, the defendant in federal prison
escape prosecutions will not be forced to rely solely on duress and
mistake defenses in claiming that his escape was "involuntary." He
now has a second option: in the appropriate circumstances,6 1 when
the prosecution's evidence of an intentional escape is based solely on
the inferences that can be drawn from departure from prison without permission, the defendant can present evidence rebutting this
inference.
He can thereby force the prosecution to present
proof of the presence of an actual intent to avoid confinement as
an element of the crime.6 2 This new, added requirement of proof
63
has far-reaching implications for future escape prosecutions.
A. Intent as an Element of Escape
4
Escape was traditionally considered a "general intent" crime.
"No state of mind is required for guilt of escape other than the

prerequisites are not satisfied. In the court's view, the factors represented
by the prerequisites are the most significant considerations, but none of the
prerequisites by itself is necessarily determinative. Once the defendant has
presented a threshold amount of evidence, that evidence is to be considered
by a properly instructed jury.
585 F.2d at 1096 n.28. The test articulated in this Comment relates only to the
immediacy requirement. Although Bailey indicated that the other requirements for
the duress defense are flexible, it did not elaborate its reasons, nor did it suggest
what mitigating factors should be considered. The present discussion has therefore
centered exclusively on the requirement of immediacy, for here the case presents at
least some attempt at a rationale. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
59 People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112
(1974).
60 585 F.2d at 1094-95, 1101.
61 See text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
62 585 F.2d at 1093. This approach is novel in federal law, even though the
language was the same in United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1974),

because in Bailey, a federal court for the first time suggested that a prisoner who
seeks only to avoid intolerable conditions has not displayed the requisite intent to
avoid confinement, and therefore is innocent of the charge of escape under 18
U.S.C. § 751 (1976). 585 F.2d at 1093 n.17. For state court interpretations see
text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
63 See part III infra.

64 "[A] great deal of unnecessary confusion has been generated by the use of
ill-defined terms and concepts such as 'specific' and 'general' intent." United States
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. ,, 5 Some courts, howintent to go beyond permitted limits
ever, have recognized that there must at least be an intent to leave
]awful custody. 66 For example, in several recent cases involving
intoxication defenses, if some higher level of intent were not an
element of the crime, the drunken prisoner who stumbled across

prison boundaries could have been found guilty of escape without
further inquiry0 7 But, even though the strict general intent standard has been somewhat relaxed, no federal court has yet held that
an escapee whose sole intent was to avoid intolerable prison con0 8
ditions lacked the necessary criminal intent.
v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621
(U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990) (footnote omitted). A federal court approved one
definition of the difference between the two types of intent that had been given as
an instruction to a jury: "Specific intent, as the term itself suggests, requires more
than a mere general intent to engage in certain conduct. A person who knowingly
does an act which the law forbids, or knowingly fails to do an act which the law
requires, intending with evil motive or bad purpose either to disobey or disregard
the law, may be found to act with specific intent." Rivers v. United States, 368 F.2d
362, 364 (9th Cir. 1966), cited in United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516, 517 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1974).
. R. PERnNs, supra note 32, at 504 (citing State v. Clark, 32 Nev. 145, 104
P.2d 593 (1909), which involved the sufficiency of an indictment for attempted
escape). Many courts have followed this rule. See, e.g., People v. Haskins, 177
Cal. App. 2d 84, 2 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1960) (holding that under California's escape
statute, only general intent to do the act need be shown, and that voluntary intoxication is therefore no defense); Wiggins v. State, 194 Ind. 118, 141 N.E. 56 (1923)
(affirming convictions on the basis that intent can be inferred from the fact of
defendants' departure of their own volition); State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 134
N.W.2d 922 (1965) (holding that under the Iowa statute neither guilty knowledge
nor criminal intent need be proved). Cf. United States v. Locke, 425 F.2d 313,
315 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that a statement signed by defendant upon incarceration, by which he acknowledged that leaving without permission or failure to return
"shall be deemed an escape," was properly admitted, thus suggesting that improper
absence alone constitutes escape).
66 See, e.g., People v. Weiseman, 280 N.Y. 385, 21 N.E.2d 362 (1939) (when
a prisoner was allowed to leave a detention area, state must prove prisoner knew
discharge was illegal; escape charge dismissed because court guards could provide
no evidence on circumstances of departure, while defendant testified that he was
told to leave). Cf. Coleman v. State, 83 Tex Crim. 472, 204 S.W. 332 (1918)
(defendant who had been released to an employer under a convict bond arrangement was innocent of escape although he left that employer's premises, since the
departure was made because he had nothing to eat, had not been informed of
arrangements for food, and later informed the employer of his whereabouts).
67 See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 193 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 969 (1952) (holding that the lower court properly admitted defendant's
claim that a drug overdose rendered him incapable of knowingly intending to
escape, but agreeing that a jury could disbelieve the claim and on the evidence
convict defendant of escape); People v. Dolatowski, 94 Ill. App. 2d 434, 237 N.E.2d
553 (1968) (reversing defendant's conviction because the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on an intoxication defense, placing too great a burden of proof
on the defendant). Cf. Chandler v. United States, 378 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1967)
(affirming convictions of defendants, who, although arguably lacking in the necessary
intent to escape at the time of their departure because of intoxication, demonstrated
the requisite intent by later actions, including theft of a vehicle).
68 United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990).
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1. State Court Decisions Presaging Bailey
State courts have traditionally followed the rule that general
prison conditions, no matter how bad, offer no excuse for escape.6 9
Those courts have recognized, however, that under certain circumstances the "escapee" has not committed the crime of escape, but
such cases have been restricted to those instances in which the
prisoner was forced to leave under duress,70 was mistaken about his
right to leave, 71 or was so intoxicated as to be incapable of knowing
the consequences of his actions. 72
In contrast to this traditional rule, Florida permits consideration of the particular prisoner's decision to escape. If he did so
only to avoid a particularly intolerable condition, the requisite intent is lacking. Two cases illustrate the Florida rule. In Bavero
v. State,73 an escape conviction was reversed when an inmate fled
to seek recognition of and assistance for a severe medical condition.
Upon transfer to a new institution, the inmate's medical classification had been upgraded and he was declared fit for hard labor.
Actually incapable of doing such work because of a life-long asthmatic condition, he resisted, and was consequently placed in a
device called "the box" for a number of hours and told that he
would b, left there permanently if he resisted again. Repeated attempts to seek review of his work designation or further examination of his condition were unsuccessful. He could work only by
using an inhaler several times hourly, although he had been previously told that he would suffer a heart attack if it were used more
than six times daily. Finally, he escaped. When captured a few
69 See, e.g., State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973) (threats by
officers to harm defendant cannot justify escape); Matthews v. State, 288 So. 2d 712
(Miss. 1974) (threats by guards to kill defendants offered no basis for a defense);
State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073
(1972) (prior homosexual attacks and threats of future attacks do not constitute a
basis for a defense when the defendant had several hours in which to report the
threats). For a more extensive compilation of such cases, see State v. Alberigo, 109
Ariz. 294, 297, 508 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1973).
70 See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1974); People v. Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975). See generally
the discussion of the duress defense in Part I supra.
71 See, e.g., People v. Weiseman, 280 N.Y. 385, 21 N.E.2d 362 (1939) (when
a prisoner was allowed to leave a detention area, state must prove prisoner knew
discharge was illegal; escape charge dismissed because court guards could provide
no evidence on circumstances of departure, while defendant testified that he was
told to leave); State v. Pace, 192 N.C. 780, 136 S.E. 11 (1926) (defendant, who
allegedly assisted in posting a fraudulent bond to secure release of a prisoner, held
innocent of assisting escape because prisoner was unaware bond was fraudulent).
72 See cases cited in note 67 supra.
73 347 So. 2d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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hours later, he claimed he was only seeking help from federal authorities. The court, noting that the defendant had since been
reclassified and given lighter work assignments, reversed a conviction for escape because the trial court had disallowed introduction
of defendant's rationale for the departure.
Another Florida court similarly reversed an escape conviction
in Lewis v. State,7 4 stating that the trial court should have admitted
defendant's evidence relevant to his claim that he lacked the requisite intent to escape because his sole reason for leaving prison was
to contact a judge to secure protection from sexual assaults. The
defendant had argued that the fact that he had fled to a radio tower
on the roof of the prison, while another inmate, escaping at the
same time, had left the prison entirely, was evidence that he was
avoiding a condition of confinement, not confinement itself. The
appellate court held that the theory and evidence suggesting a lack
of intent should have been admitted.
Thus state courts, particularly those in Florida, have begun to
require more than mere general intent in escape prosecutions.75
The concerns that led to these state decisions parallel those that
resulted in the Bailey decision.
2. Federal Precedent for the Bailey Rule: The Applicability
of United States v. Nix
According to the Bailey court, United States v. Nix 76 represents an abrupt break with the traditional federal rule that prison
conditions are irrelevant to intent determinations.7 7 If this analysis
is sound, neither the escapee who is intoxicated nor the escapee who
is avoiding intolerable prison conditions (provided that such avoidance is the only reason for his flight) are guilty of the federal charge
of escape; in each case the requisite element of criminal intent is
absent. Nix eschewed the labels of "general" and "specific" intent,
inquiring instead into "what constitutes the 'escape' element of the
crime" 78 and concluding that "escape [is] a voluntary departure
74 318 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 608
(Fla. 1976).
75 See Coleman v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 472, 204 S.W. 332 (1918)

(prisoner

bonded to one employer who left because of lack of food found innocent of escape
even though a general intent could be found and there was no threat rising to the
level of duress). See also People v. Field, 28 Mich. App. 476, 184 N.W.2d 551
(1970) (burden is on the state to prove that defendant did not leave prison under
duress).
76 501 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1974).
77 585 F.2d at 1092-93.
78 501 F.2d at 518.
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from custody with an intent to avoid confinement." 79 In defining
the elements of federal escape, Nix relied upon earlier mistake cases
in which the escapee departed from prison either because he was intoxicated8 0 or because he was justifiably mistaken, leaving prison
honestly believing that he had been set free by the law.8 1

But Nix

in no way suggested that a prisoner fleeing only the presence of intolerable conditions has not exhibited the criminal intent required
in escape prosecutions. Nevertheless, Bailey relied upon Nix in
adopting this proposition.8 2 In order to determine whether the
application of the Nix rule to Bailey situations is justifiable, it is
necessary to examine the underlying rationales for the intent
requirement.
The Nix court identified two bases for the necessity of showing
intent in escape prosecutions:
The courts have been close to unanimous in requiring
intent to escape probably for two reasons. The first is
"the desire to have one human element of 'blameworthiness' as a basis for punishment." The other reason is the
knowledge that a prisoner who has no intent to escapebecause he is grossly intoxicated, or thinks his jailer has
told him to leave, or mistakes the boundaries of his confinement, or has a gun held to his head by another inmateis not likely to endanger society, as a willful escapee is.3
These reasons were acknowledged in Bailey,84 but the court failed
to apply them to situations in which allegedly intolerable conditions
precipitated the escape. The Bailey court's reliance on Nix is
justifiable only if these rationales remain valid when intolerable
prison conditions, not mistake, are the "cause" of the escape. Even
if the Nix reasons are not appropriate, there may be other justifications for the Bailey intent rule, in which case the court should have
spelled them out, rather than relying on Nix.
a. Blameworthiness
Initially, the "blameworthiness" rationale appears to be inapposite in the case of an escape from intolerable conditions. When
the intoxicated prisoner awakes, he will realize his error and return
79Id. 519.
80 See cases cited in note 67 supra.

See
585
83 501
84 585
81

82

cases
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

cited in note 71 supra.
at 1092-93.
at 519 (footnote omitted).
at 1092-93.
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to custody; had he been sober he would not have attempted to depart. Similarly, when the prisoner learns that his jailer was mistaken in allowing him to leave, he will return to custody. s5 In a
very real sense, such escapees are not responsible for their actions.
Therefore, punishing them would have no deterrent effect; they
are not "blameworthy." 8 6 By contrast, the prisoner who escapes
solely to avoid intolerable conditions intensely desires to leave, for
he believes that escape offers his sole opportunity to avoid threatened harm.sT His act results from a conscious decision to risk apprehension and punishment because of the magnitude of the harm
threatening him. Theoretically, at least, the deterrent effect of
punishment in this instance would be relatively high. The greater
the potential risk, the less likely is the threatened prisoner to chance
flight.
A closer examination of the situation of a prisoner fleeing intolerable conditions, however, reveals a compelling parallel with
situations that have been said to present a lack of intent to escape. 88
The threatened prisoner, like the intoxicated or mistaken prisoner,
does not escape because he would rather be free than incarcerated.
Although that may be a factor, as in the mistake cases, he escapes
primarily to be free from the intolerable conditions that pose dangers to his personal security.8 9 Such action is difficult to characterize as "blameworthy." A jury might excuse such behavior if it were
to consider simultaneously the conditions that motivated the defendant to flee. It is precisely in this instance that other cases interpose duress as a legitimate affirmative defense; the defendant may
either lack the necessary subjective state, or mens rea, to be held
85 This discussion assumes that there was no intent to escape confinement prior
to the intoxication or mistake of the official.
80 If such escapees did not in fact return to prison after they sobered or learned
of the mistake, an intent to escape would be evidenced. Formation of such an
intent, however, would post-date the actual departure. At that earlier point in time
an intent to escape may have been absent. For instance, an intoxicated escapee
may wake up, discover his freedom, and then decide to remain free. Criminal
intent is formed only at this point, and not when he stumbles across the prison
boundaries. Paradoxically, an intent to escape may be absent when the prisoner
departs from prison; an intent to escape may surface when a prisoner has already
been free for some period of time. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 378 F.2d
906 (9th Cir. 1967) (while intent was arguably absent at time of departure, it was
demonstrated by later actions, including auto theft).
87 This discussion assumes that the prisoner has exhausted the available legal
alternatives, such as resort to the courts and complaints to the prison authorities.
88 See, for example, the hypothetical situations described in the context of the
escapee who will not endanger society in United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516, 519
(7th Cir. 1974), quoted at text accompanying note 83 supra.
89 See text accompanying notes 99-123 infra.
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responsible for his behavior,9 0 or, even in jurisdictions which require only a general intent to escape, 91 the defendant's actions may
be justified. Such cases realistically recognize that free will can be
encumbered by external constraints. Therefore, it is extremely
problematical to place blame on the prisoner who flees from intolerable conditions. The criminal law excuses the prisoner who is
pushed across the prison grounds with a cocked gun at his head;
similarly, it should excuse the Bailey-type defendant, who, had he
not been subjected to threats to his personal security, would not
have escaped, assuming there is no contrary evidence. 92 Thus the
"blameworthiness" rationale is applicable in the context of an escape
from intolerable prison conditions.
b. Danger to Society
The second basis identified in Nix for requiring intent as an
element in escape prosecutions was that a prisoner who lacks such
intent is unlikely to be a danger to society. 93 This second rationale
shifts the focus from the individual defendant to the societal harm
he is likely to cause in attempting to attain or maintain freedom.
"A prisoner who leaves his custody without an intent to escape will
not use force to leave the prison nor resist capture when he is
found." 94 Such a prediction is inapposite in the Bailey situation. 9
If the escapee is fleeing from significant threats to his personal safety,
he will probably employ every possible means to facilitate his
escape. He has been threatened with serious bodily injury or even
death; it is therefore unrealistic to suppose that he will shy away
from force, or even violence, in effecting his escape. He is a "determined" man,9 determined to escape from an intolerable and
dangerous situation.
Thus, important distinctions can be drawn between the case of
the intoxicated or mistaken escapee and the escapee fleeing due to
perceived threats. The question is whether these distinctions render
the Bailey court's reliance on Nix invalid. A possible solution to the
90 See cases cited in note 42 supra.
91 See notes 64-68 supra & accompanying text.
92 See note 86 supra.
93 501 F.2d at 519.
94 Id. This rationale assumes that the intoxicated escapee with no intent to
avoid confinement will meekly surrender himself to the authorities when he sobers.
At the least, such an escapee is unlikely to resist recapture or "rob a store to facilitate
his escape."

Id.

95 This prediction is equally inapposite, however, to the Nix hypothetical of the
prisoner with a gun to his head.

90 501 F.2d at 519.

See text accompanying note 83 supra.

1979]

PRISON-ESCAPE PROSECUTIONS

problem of potential violence would be to preclude the use of this
"intent theory" by defendants who do in fact resort to force. This,
however, would be logically inconsistent with the blameworthiness
rationale. Certainly some escapees could truly intend only to flee
from intolerable conditions and yet still resort to violence or force.
Indeed, the most determined escapees-those who are most threatened by imminent and severe harm-will be the ones most likely to
use force. A more reasonable solution would be to treat the escapees
like ordinary citizens and hold them criminally liable for behavior
that ordinarily would be punished. If the determined escapee steals
a car, he should be charged with auto theft but not with escape if,
in fact, he lacks the necessary criminal intent 7 In addition, the
Nix social-danger rationale is applicable once the escapee has completely effected his escape. Although such an escapee is perhaps
unlikely to return voluntarily, he did not escape to avoid confinement and is therefore not as great a social danger as a prisoner
escaping to resume a criminal career. Thus Bailey's reliance on
Nix is justifiable, even though Bailey itself neglects the crucial task
of determining whether Nix does in fact provide such support. A
more serious shortcoming of the Bailey opinion, however, is that it
does not attempt to resolve the problem of the violent escapee. 98
B. Elements of the Intent Test

Although Bailey held that the trial court was incorrect in its
finding that escape requires only general intent, agreeing with Nix
that intent is an element of the crime, ironically, the actual test to
determine the presence or absence of the requisite criminal intent
was buried in a footnote. 9 Bailey first distinguished "confinement"
and "non-confinement" conditions. The former comprise the "normal incidents of confinement." '10 For example, "[o]ne who leaves
custody without permission to see his mother who is ill or to improve his menu . . .has an intent to avoid confinement since re-

stricted contact with relatives and a reasonably limited choice of diet
are normal incidents of confinement." 101 The majority thus recog97 See text accompanying notes 99-123 infra. If, however, the escapee is acting
under duress, some criminal acts that may accompany his escape (e.g., fighting off

a fellow inmate in order to reach the prison wall) may be excused. The duress
affects both the act of escaping and concomitant acts necessary to effectuate the
escape. See text accompanying notes 156-60 infra.
98
See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra. For a further discussion of this
problem, see text accompanying notes 151-60 infra.

99 585 F.2d at 1093 n.17.
100 Id.
10, Id.
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nized that incarceration necessarily entails certain basic infringements of personal liberty. Conversely, if an inmate escaped
confinement solely to avoid "conditions that are not normal aspects
of 'confinement'-such as beating in reprisal for testimony in a trial,
failure to provide essential medical care, or homosexual attacks-the
intent element of the crime of escape may not be satisfied." 102
As the dissent in Bailey accurately pointed out, the trier of fact
must undertake a three-part inquiry: "First, what condition or factor
prompted the defendant to depart from custody? Second, was this
condition a 'normal incident of confinement'? And, third, was the
defendant's departure prompted 'only' by this factor or condition?" 103 Although the question of intent is not a component of
the defendant's defense, it is an element of the crime and must therefore be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt; 104 thus
as a purely practical matter the burden of production of a lack of
intent rests upon the defendant. An intent to avoid confinement
may be inferred from the fact of escape; therefore, evidence that the
defendant departed from the prison without permission is sufficient
to meet this required showing of intent unless the defendant then
submits evidence that points to an intent to avoid intolerable conditions, not confinement.10 5 Thereafter the prosecutor can rebut
the evidence, exposing inconsistencies in defendant's evidence and
presenting new evidence demonstrating that the defendant actually
intended to avoid confinement.
The prosecutor can offer evidence of any circumstances or
behavior inconsistent with the defendant's exculpatory contentions. Depending on that evidence, a prosecutor may
argue that the conditions allegedly necessitating the defendant's departure from custody were relatively mild, that
alternative remedies short of escape (e.g. resort to prison
authorities or the courts) were available, or that the defendant failed to return voluntarily to custody once the
102 Id. (emphasis in original).

Apparently the task of deciding what constitutes

such non-confinement conditions is left to the trier of fact. In most cases the answer
will be self-evident:
Jurors are readily aware that a person serving a sentence for a crime is

"confined"--i.e. his liberty is restricted-in certain fundamental ways. For

example, he cannot leave the institution wherein he is confined, he cannot
come and go as he pleases, his daily schedule is subject to various controls,

his privacy is substantially curtailed, and he is subject to strict discipline.
Id.
103

Id. 1129 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).

104 Id. 1094 n.18.
105 Id. 1094 n.19.
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conditions allegedly motivating the escape no longer threatened him.106
These standards are not "inflexible requirements," but they are
germane to the jury's inquiry.107 Thus the prosecutor can argue
that the defendant's failure to meet certain minimal standards of
conduct,10 8 such as attempting to make use of prison or judicial
remedies to correct the intolerable conditions before fleeing, precludes his attempt to claim a lack of criminal intent. This appears
at first to be logically inconsistent with the intent rationale. Consider the situation of an escapee who honestly believed that his life
was threatened by intolerable prison conditions, that such conditions actually existed, and that the jury would conclude that these
conditions were "non-confinement conditions." 109 If the jury were
properly to focus its inquiry upon the presence or absence of criminal intent, it should make no difference that this defendant did not
first resort to the prison authorities or the courts, for the jury's inquiry into criminal intent is necessarily subjective." 0 The jury
should not ask what a reasonable person would have felt or done if
he were threatened under similar circumstances, but should examine
what this particular defendant felt: did this threat cause him to
leave prison? Even though the intent inquiry is subjective, consideration of these standards of conduct is necessary to the intent
inquiry. The trier of fact is faced with the difficult task of determining the defendant's psychological motivation for escaping. The
defendant's actions, as well as his testimony, are helpful in making
this determination. The failure of the defendant to make use of
readily available and reasonably efficacious alternatives to escape, for
example, suggests that his real motive was avoidance of confinement.
There are additional reasons to give weight to objective standards. Because prison escapes have potentially disruptive and chaotic
effects upon society, public policy considerations cannot be ignored.
Such considerations support the introduction of a further objective
106 Id. 1094.
107 Id. 1096 n.28.

See People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 342, 362 N.E.2d 319,
323 (1977). Five absolute preconditions to the defense of duress were stated in
People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). See note
20 supra. A defendant tried under the Bailey intent rule, unlike a defendant tried
under the Lovercamp criteria, will not necessarily be found guilty as a matter of
law if the five conditions are not met. But see note 42 supra.
108 Such minimal standards have also been required for the duress defense.
See note 20 supra.
109 In addition, assume that the defendant escaped solely because of these confinement conditions. See text accompanying notes 113-17 infra.
110 See R. PEaniNs, supra note 32, at 573-74.
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component into the intent test. The escapee's fears must be "reason.
able""' and his response must be reasonable. Hence the jury
should properly consider the defendant's failure to take advantage
of available alternatives short of escape. If the jury is unable to
find a satisfactory reason for defendant's omission, it may find criminal intent, even though the defendant actually may have escaped to
avoid non-confinement conditions. The escape remedy is therefore
restricted to those inmates who resort to it when there are no other
reasonably available and effective alternatives."- 2
Even if the defendant successfully establishes that he was motivated to escape to avoid a non-confinement condition," 3 he may
still be convicted of escape under the Bailey approach. To be found
innocent under the Bailey rule, the defendant must escape solely to
avoid non-confinement conditions. 114 This added requirement of
exclusivity may create paradoxical situations. Consider the inmate
who has been repeatedly attacked and has just as repeatedly complained-unsuccessfully-to prison authorities. Threatened again,
he escapes to avoid this "non-confinement" condition of threats and
111 See note 102 supra & accompanying text. The defendant's evidence of
intolerable prison conditions must convince the jury that these conditions are indeed
intolerable. Certain conditions, even though "nonconfinement" in nature, might not
warrant escape as a response, for there is a minimal level of harm to which a condition must rise. For an analogous notion in the eighth amendment context, see
Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. RPv. 533 (1978).
112 Under a strict reading of the intent theory, the absence of criminal intent is
certainly questionable when obvious alternatives were available to defendant but he
ignored them and escaped. The trier of fact may deem his story implausible and
rather believe that defendant's real intent was to escape from "confinement conditions."
11 The line between confinement and non-confinement conditions is ordinarily
distinct. See text accompanying note 102 supra. But what result should follow if
the escapee reacted to a mild non-confinement condition, such as a very mild beating
at the hands of a fellow inmate? If the defendant successfully meets the other
requirements of the intent test, will this minor non-confinement condition negate
criminal intent? Bailey asserts that the defendant must introduce some threshold
amount of evidence to meet the requirement of a non-confinement condition. "Since
the evidence offered by [defendants] in this case was clearly 'substantial,' we need
not decide the minimum threshold of evidence necessary to entitle a defendant to
this instruction." 585 F.2d at 1094 n.19. Unless it is absolutely clear that nonconfinement conditions do not exist, this question should be left for the jury. "[T]he
proper approach is to inform the jury of those considerations that are relevant to its
deliberations, not to take the issue out of its hands." Id. 1096.
114 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
[I]f a prisoner offers evidence to show that he left confinement only to
avoid conditions that are not normal aspects of "confinement" .. . the intent
element of the crime of escape may not be satisfied. When a defendant
introduces evidence that he was subject to such "non-confinement" conditions, the crucial factual determination on the intent issue is thus whether
the defendant left custody only to avoid these conditions or whether, in
addition, the defendant also intended to avoid confinement.
585 F.2d at 1093 n.17 (emphasis in original).
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violence. At trial, however, the prosecutor offers evidence conclusively demonstrating that defendant also. departed to see his sick
mother. The intent element of the crime is now satisfied, despite
the extreme nature of this "non-confinement" condition, for defendant did not possess the sole intent to avoid non-confinement
conditions."1
C. Majority v. Dissent
Judge Wilkey, in dissent, argued strongly against the majority's
innovative intent test. He would approach the question of coercion
under the sole rubric of duress. "If legally sufficient duress does
not exist, then the defendant is deemed to be acting voluntarily as
a matter of law." I'll He would thus deflect the inquiry away from
the individual defendant by adopting the more stringent and objec11 7
tive approach formulated in People v. Lovercamp.
Ultimately, however, the disagreement between majority and
dissent rests on core philosophical differences concerning "the issue
of voluntariness and reflects a policy decision as to the point or stage
up to which an individual under compulsion should be expected to
resist pressure and act according to his own will . . .. " 118 In
particular, the dissent maintains that a "knowing" state of mind
comprises the necessary intent to establish criminal liability.1 19
"There is no doubt that defendants consciously and deliberately
departed from prison and that they were aware of the nature of
their actions. They freely admit this, and this is all that is required
to establish the 'intent' element required under 18 U.S.C. § 751." 120
Thus, according to the dissent, it is enough that the defendants knew
that they were leaving prison. Unlike an intoxicated prisoner, they
115 See text accompanying note 103 supra. The Bailey intent test is essentially
a relaxation of traditional duress notions. The requisite conditions, such as immediacy of the harm, are relevant but not determinative. The prisoner who escapes
to visit his mother could still attempt to justify his escape on duress grounds, but
would have difficulty in justifying his continued absence.
116 585 F.2d at 1120 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
See note 20 supra.
11743 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
While the court and the dissent basically agree on what issues are relevant
to weighing evidence of prison conditions in escape cases . . . the dissent
would hold all such evidence irrelevant as a matter of law unless it is
determined that every one of [the] five specific [Lovercamp] prerequisites
related to these issues is met.
585 F.2d at 1096 n.28 (emphasis in original).
.18 Id. 1106 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
119MoDEL PrNAL CODE §2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962):
"A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result."
120 585 F.2d at 1126 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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were quite aware of the consequences of their action; such general
intent is sufficient.12 By contrast, the majority demands a higher
level of intent, namely "purposive" action. 12 For the majority, it
is not enough if the jury finds that the escapee knew that he was
leaving prison. Knowledge of the consequences of his behavior is
insufficient. 128 The jury must further ask what reasons compelled
this choice, and must conclude that one of the prisoner's purposes
in departing was to avoid confinement conditions. The question
of motive and intent thereby becomes central.
This debate ultimately centers on the social utility of the competing definitions of escape. The resolution of such a dispute over
practical politics demands an analysis of the effects of the majority's
approach.
III. DuREss

AND INTENT: ATTENDANT EFFECTS OF
SHIMTNG THE BURDEN

The Bailey intent approach is primarily subjective: it mandates
an examination of the defendant's mental state. This is a more
relaxed test than the traditional duress approach, which combined
Under the more lenient
both subjective and objective elements.2
Bailey rule, generalized conditions alone may be sufficient to negate
the voluntariness of the escapee.u 5 More importantly, the inquiry
into a defendant's voluntariness is no longer dependent upon the
defendant's ability to meet his burden of proving lack of intent as
an affirmative defense. The voluntariness inquiry becomes instead
a question of the defendant's intent, which the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

26

This transfer of the burden of

proof is likely to produce even more lenient results; the shifting of
121 Cf. People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969)
("Defendant does not deny that he intended to leave the prison, and this is all the
intent the law requires.").
122 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "A
person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result .... "
123 For example, defendants who leave a prison due to guard brutality surely
know that they are departing the grounds. But if their minds are solely focused
upon escaping the brutality, the necessary "purposive action" is absent.
124 Under the traditional duress test the defendant must show that he was
compelled to escape and that a reasonable person would similarly have been compelled. (And, of course, the danger must be imminent and impending, and likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury.) See United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d
1087, 1096 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979)
(No. 278-990).
1 5 Rather than establish any specific threats, the defendant must merely show
that "evidence of jail conditions, threats, and violence . . . raises reasonable doubts
concerning [his] . . . intent to avoid confinement" Id. 1094.
126 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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the burden and the negation of intent by pleading generalized
prison conditions will enable many more defendants to reach juries
with evidence of intolerable prison conditions. Finally, Bailey, like
other recent cases,r 7 evidences a general relaxation of the previous
strict duress requirements that in many cases have precluded defendants from reaching the jury. 128 This Comment concludes that
the majority opinion in Bailey is properly sensitive to the plight of
the prisoner in the present penal system. The opinion is, however,
at times cavalier in its amendment of prior doctrine; it does not
carefully justify its holdings, nor does it examine the implications
of its actions. A complete analysis of Bailey must therefore examine
its potential effect on the penal system and the individual defendant.
A. The PotentialIncrease in Incidence of Escape
Traditionally, the judiciary has limited, or even denied, the
duress defense to escapees primarily because it has feared that a
"rash" of escapes would ensue- 2 9 Although many of the most recent
cases have recognized the legitimate concerns of escapees, 8 0 the
underlying public policy considerations limiting potential excuses
for escape have not thereby vanished. As a result, some courts have
adopted strict conditions limiting the presentation of the duress
defense in an attempt to satisfy both sides of the balance.' 81 Bailey's
adoption of more lenient standards shifts that balance in favor of
the escapee and presents the question whether this leniency ignores
significant societal concerns.
2
1 7

See, e.g., People v. Unger, 33 IM.App. 3d 770, 338 N.E.2d 442 (1975),
aff'd, 66 II.2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
128 See, e.g., People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 337 n.3, 236 N.W.2d
72, 75 n.3 (1975).
129 E.g., People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918
(1969). See also State v.Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950).
Ithas been suggested that "[tihe solution must rather come from some kind of
penological reform." People v.Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916,
918 (1969).
130 See, e.g., People v.Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1974); Helton v.State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. App. 1975); People v. Unger, 66
Ill.
2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v.Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d
187 (1975). See note 42 supra.
Traditionally, the courts have balanced the interests of society against the
immediate problems of the escaping defendant. This has tended to focus
attention away from the immediate choices available to the defendant and
the propriety of his cause of action. Thus, reprehensible conditions have
been found to be insufficient to justify the escape, the public interest
outweighing the defendant's interest.
People v.Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1974).
131 "While we conclude that under certain circumstances a defense of necessity
may be proven by the defendant, at the same time we place rigid limitations on
the viability of the defense inorder to insure that the rights and interests of society
will not be impinged upon." Id. 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
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Courts have expressed fear that chaos would result if the duress
defense were more readily available to escapees. This fear reflects
an underlying assumption that there is a high potential for abuse of
this defense. As one court stated, "it is easy to visualize a rash of
escapes, all rationalized by unverifiable tales of sexual assault." 132
These courts felt that a readily available duress defense would add
another element to an inmate's calculus when contemplating an
escape: he would believe that if he were to be apprehended, he could
avoid punishment by resorting to the excuse that his escape was
compelled by a homosexual assault. These fears of the duress defense were largely groundless, for a tale of sexual assault demands
that the defendant name his attacker. Barring the possibility of
collusion among inmates, 13 a defendant would be hard-pressed to
meet this difficult condition. 134
Under the Bailey intent test and its relaxation of prior doctrine,
however, the fear of an increase in the number of unwarranted
escapes does appear to be more justified. By easing the specificity
of the harm that must be shown, Bailey requires the escapee only
to point to intolerable conditions that have impinged upon his
personal security. 3 5 This is a less onerous burden, as intolerable
conditions are prevalent in most prisons. An artful and shrewd
defendant could at least arguably demonstrate that some of these
have directly affected his health or safety. "To make it the province
of every prisoner in every jail in the land to decide for himself
whether conditions were so unbearable as to justify his escape would
only serve to increase the number of attempts to break jail ... ," 186
The danger of an increase in the number of escapes by prisoners
who fabricate an intent to avoid non-confinement conditions is, how132 People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969).
'33 "[P]risoners might plot together and implement a plan which would look
like one of their lives was being threatened. The 'threatened' inmate could then
escape and plead duress if caught." Note, Duress and the Prison Escape: A New
Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. 11Ev. 1062, 1081 (1972) (emphasis in
original). Such collusion is highly implausible, for few inmates would be willing
to bear the consequences of being the supposed assaulter.
134 Additionally, such a fear does not take into account other conditions typically
imposed by courts that narrow the use of the duress defense, such as the return
requirement. Indeed this requirement renders inapposite the fears expressed in
People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969). See text accompanying note 132 supra. At most a cunning inmate could get over the wall, at which
point, under a standard definition of the return requirement, he must "immediately
[report] to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from
the immediate threat." People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 832, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 110, 115 (1974). See text accompanying notes 137-45 infra.
135 See text accompanying notes 48-59 supra.
136 State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310, 72 A.2d 442, 444 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950)
(emphasis added).
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ever, undercut by the "return requirement." 137 This condition
responds to societal concerns by severely limiting the time that the
accused and convicted criminal can roam the streets. Chaos cannot
result if the escapee must immediately surrender to the authorities.
Although the Bailey intent test does not adhere to any "inflexible
prerequisites," 188 including the return requirement, 13 9 it does recognize that the escapee's failure or tardiness to return is one of "the
most significant considerations" 140 for the jury. Whether the
prisoner returns to custody remains an extremely important consideration in determining the defendant's intent.141 Although Bailey
does not impose a rigid rule, it does not thereby undermine the
reliance of other courts on the prerequisite of return as a means to
effectuate a sensible balance between the needs of society and the
prisoner.
The fact that the jury will be required to evaluate a defendant's intent under the Bailey rule provides a sufficient safeguard
against the possibility of a multitude of phony "involuntary" escapes from intolerable prison conditions. A defendant must raise
the issue of his voluntariness, "by competent evidence in a trial
where the testimony of witnesses is subjected to the scrutiny of the
fact-finder who, in the course of determining the true facts of the
case, would properly consider the credibility of the various witnesses." 142 The prosecutor, in meeting the burden of rebutting
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's version of his intent,
will be able to point out inconsistencies between the defendant's
actions and what are often prerequisites to a duress defense in more
rigid jurisdictions than the District of Columbia Circuit. Under the
Bailey intent test, these prerequisites can serve as guidelines in aiding the fact-finder to determine the veracity of the defendant's
claims. 143 Bailey's relaxation of the return requirement must be
viewed in this context. An escapee who does not immediately turn
himself in is not thereby precluded from reaching the jury. Prac137 See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr.

110, 115 (1974) ("The fear of unwarranted uses of the duress defense also fails to
take into account the return requirement."); 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 956, 963 (1974).
138 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28.
139 See note 20 supra.
140 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28.
141 See text accompanying
142 People v. Harmon, 53

notes 107-11 supra.
Mich. App. 482, 487, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1975).
Cf. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1096 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. 1979) (No. 78-990) ("Once the defendant has
presented a threshold amount of evidence, that evidence is to be considered by a
properly instructed jury:').
143 See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra. See also People v. Unger, 66
Ill. 2d 333, 342, 362 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977).
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tically, however, he must still be able to convince the jury that he
had a justifiable reason for waiting.144 It is exclusively the role of
the jury, as the representative of the community, to judge the credibility of a defendant's story. "[T]he framework of the fact-finding
process" 145 is the traditional means of ascertaining the truth of
other defendants' tales; it should remain as the means of determining the basis of escapees' tales.
The Bailey opinion, in discussing both duress and intent, also
relaxed the requirement of an impending injury of severe bodily
harm,1 1 but the "severity of [prison] conditions" remains a relevant
issue. 147 Nevertheless, it is clearly easier for the jury to decide if the
escapee was threatened with, or has suffered, serious bodily harm
than to determine if generalized intolerable prison conditions impinged upon his personal security. If the latter determination is
at issue, a shrewd escapee may be able to dupe the jury. But the
criminal justice system's reliance on the role of the jury does not
fluctuate with the relative ease of the particular fact-finding mission, and the possibility for error is present in all trials. If the
defendant truly departed solely to avoid intolerable prison conditions of a serious nature, the jury's refusal to bring in a verdict of
guilty would not in any way contribute to a rash of "unverifiable"
escapes. If the prisoner escaped to avoid confinement conditions,
the "traditional safeguards for determining the truth of a tale" 148
should be sufficient to preclude him from taking advantage of the
144 Escape continues to be a continuing offense. See text accompanying notes
10-15 supra. The intent test would still require that the intent in not returning to

prison be to avoid non-confinement conditions.

Cf. People v. Unger, 66 II. 2d 333,

342-43, 362 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977):

[I]n the present case defendant did not report to the authorities immediately after securing his safety. In fact, defendant never voluntarily turned
himself in to the proper officials. However, defendant testified that he
intended to return to the prison upon obtaining legal advice from an attorney and claimed that he was attempting to get money from friends to pay

for such counsel. Regardless of our opinion as to the believability of defendant's tale, this testimony, if accepted by the jury, would have negated
any negative inference which would arise from defendant's failure to report
to proper authorities after the escape.
Like Bailey, Unger recognizes the function of the jury as the trier of fact. Bailey
specifically relies upon Unger in its rejection of the stringent requirements set forth
in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974), quoted in
note 20 supra. 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28.
145 People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 488, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1975).
146 The duress discussion in Bailey also appears to weaken the immediacy requirement. See part I supra. The intent test is more innovative, however, and
subsumes the effect of the more lenient duress defense.
147 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28.
148

People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 486, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1975).
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Bailey option.1 49 Juries should not be assumed to be less competent to assess intent to escape than they are to determine intent
in other contexts. Moreover, the return requirement operates as
a continual check upon the possibilities for abuse of the Bailey
alternatives. Escape remains a continuing offense, and the consideration of return remains a highly pertinent factor. The longer
the escapee stays away from custody the more difficult will be his
task of persuading the jury that his continued freedom was justifiable. The necessity of return is a constant factor which reflects
society's interest.
Thus these two factors-the relevance of the return and use of
the fact-finding process-combine to restrict the available opportunities for devious inmates to abuse the Bailey test. The public's
interest is thereby safeguarded, and the interests of the victimized
inmates are not ignored, for there are now "workable safeguards
...

to protect their safety." 150

B. Treatment of the Violent Escapee
The fear of an increase in escapes reflects a related concern that
additional escapes increase the possibility of injuries to innocent people inflicted by fleeing inmates."5 ' The legitimacy of this fear depends upon the assumption that additional escapes would in fact
result. As we have seen, this fear is not well founded. 152 A more
difficult question under the Bailey intent test, however, is whether
escapees who are truly fleeing from non-confinement conditions and
who resort to violence to effectuate their escape are precluded from
raising involuntariness arguments. Bailey does not hold that the intent test is available only when no force or violence has been used, 153
nor does it adequately address the problem of the violent escapee. 154
Although lack of violence is a central consideration for the trier of
fact, it is not necessarily determinative. 55 Presumably, then, there
149 "Juries are accustomed to determining the intent of alleged criminals, and
we see nothing in the context of prosecutions for escape that requires the court to
risk denying the defendants a fair trial by denying the jury its normal function."
585 F.2d at 1096.
150 People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 486, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1975).
15 1 E.g., People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); State v.
Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950).
152 See text accompanying notes 137-50 supra.

153 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28. The duress defense was often held to be unavailable
when any force or violence was used.

See the requirements established in People

v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974), quoted in note 20
supra.
1 54 See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
155 585 F.2d at 1096 n.28.
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may be instances in which an escapee injures a guard but is nonetheless exonerated from the crime of escape.' 56
There are a number of possible ways to deal with the otherwise credible defendant who resorts to force or violence in effecting
his escape. One would be to preclude a defendant from gaining
the benefit of the intent test and from employing involuntariness
arguments entirely. Bailey dearly rejects this route. 57 Although
this approach takes into account the societal interest in non-violence,
as was noted earlier, it is inconsistent with the rationales underlying the creation of the intent test. 158 A more sensible response to
the violent prisoner would be to allow the defendant to reach the
jury, and perhaps even to be found innocent of the crime of
escape itself, but also to face additional criminal charges for the
violence that accompanied his escape. This approach is consistent
with the intent notions that underlie the Bailey model.' 59 A last
approach that is consistent with the Bailey opinion would allow
the violent escapee to employ involuntariness arguments, and conceivably to be excused for both the crime of escape and for the
violence used to effectuate that escape. Such a resolution is fully
consistent with the notions of intent that underlie prison-escape
prosecutions; it is also responsive to the notions of duress that characterize the criminal law generally. It recognizes that duress may
characterize all actions of the escapee, not merely the physical act
of climbing over the wall. In the process of escaping, the inmate
may be "unable" to form the requisite criminal intent to engage
in acts of violence because the involuntariness that marks his behavior in escaping affects all of his immediate actions in effectuating
the escape. The use of an involuntariness argument to justify the
use of violence in the escape should only be allowed, however, if
the initial intolerable prison condition was a threatened harm of
death or serious bodily injury-the prerequisite for the duress defense generally. The effects of exonerating the escapee for both the
escape and the attendant violence would not tip the balance in
favor of the escapee at the expense of society. The criminal law
does not ordinarily punish those who are unable to formulate the
necessary criminal intent: without the necessary mens rea the actor
is not held accountable for his actions. This approach may well be
the most appropriate response in the extraordinary case of an
156 Bailey's ambiguity in this regard is understandable, for the instant defendants did not resort to violence.
157 See text accompanying notes 153-56 supra.
158 See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.

159 Id.
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escapee who resorts to violence because he is in a state of duress
which taints both his act of departing confinement and his concomitant efforts to effectuate his escape. 6 0
CONCLUSION

United States v. Bailey represents a high water mark in the
judiciary's growing recognition of the rights of the incarcerated.
Although the opinion is marked by acute sensitivity to the plight of
the defenseless prisoner, the ultimate solution to the severe endemic
problems of penal institutions must come from the legislature.
Short of releasing prisoners, 61 the judiciary's role is limited to
excusing those who resort to self-help. Although the consequences
are less pernicious than further punishment, there are no winners
at such trials, for the defendant has already escaped, and suffered,
intolerable penal conditions. Although Bailey may aid him in
avoiding further punishment, it does not afford him his outright
release. He must return to the same set of conditions in order to
serve the remainder of his original sentence. If he returns to the
same prison his former assailants will renew their assaults; if he is
returned to another prison, there can be no guarantee that he will
be safe from other attacks. In either case, the acquitted prisoner
must again learn to cope in an atmosphere fraught with continual
threats to his personal security.
160 A final concern evinced by the judiciary with respect to the self-help measure
of escape is the fear that prison breaks would be disruptive of prison discipline,
routine, and morale. People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929);
State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310, 72 A.2d 442 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950). This objection is outdated, however; more recent cases, even those rejecting the duress defense,
have not raised this argument. See, e.g., People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 170
N.W.2d 916 (1969); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en banc), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1072 (1972). Prison discipline and order are indeed laudable
societal goals. But they should not be allowed to outweigh the legitimate concerns
of an inmate who has escaped precisely because prison discipline and routine can not
protect him from threat and attack. To prevent this escapee from raising involuntariness arguments would be incongruous. It would punish the inevitable
byproduct of the penal system, but ignore, and thus encourage, the underlying
causes. A more effective method of improving prison order would be to ameliorate
the problem itself rather than to punish further those who have been harmed by the
lawlessness and disorder. Such an approach would thereby reduce the incidence
of excusable prison escapes.
If the conditions of our penal institutions have reached the point where the
only recourse to free oneself from unwanted personal attacks is to flee,
then any improvements made in our prisons with respect to assuring the
personal safety of the inmates could only serve to eliminate from the ranks
of escapees those who do so solely in an effort to protect themselves. The
result, therefore, might well be fewer prison escapes rather than more.
People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 487-88, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1975).
161 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (court enjoined further confinement at the Manhattan
House of Detention for Men (the "Tombs") because conditions and practices at the
institution violated the constitutional rights of detainees).

